The recent sentencing of Hong Kong media entrepreneur and pro-democracy figure Jimmy Lai has sent a clear signal far beyond the city’s borders. Once known as one of Asia’s freest media environments, Hong Kong is now regularly cited by press-freedom watchdogs as an example of how quickly space for independent journalism can shrink. The case reflects a broader shift in how governments use legal systems and national security laws to control information and discourage critical reporting.

Press freedom rarely collapses in a single dramatic moment. More often, it erodes gradually through legal pressure, intimidation, and financial strain, making independent reporting increasingly difficult. In recent years, this pattern has become visible across different political systems and regions.

For democracies, this trend cannot be treated as a distant or isolated problem. The decline of press freedom weakens the global flow of reliable information that democratic societies depend on. As a result, democracies must respond more actively by defending press freedom through diplomacy, institutional protections, and support for independent journalism.

A Global Pattern of Suppression

In Ukraine, the cost of reporting the truth has become starkly clear. According to Reporters Without Borders, over 175 journalists have been victims of abuse since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. These abuses range from injuries caused by shelling and gunfire to kidnappings, threats and detention. Broadcasting towers have been destroyed, and newsrooms have been evacuated. According to a survey, about 10 per cent of Ukrainian news outlets reported a stable or improving financial situation in 2025. In contrast, the vast majority were in precarious conditions or facing worsening financial circumstances.

Meanwhile, Iran has sentenced Nobel peace prize laureate Narges Mohammadi to more than seven more years in prison after she began a hunger strike amid Tehran’s crackdown on dissent amid Tehran’s ongoing crackdown on dissent following nationwide protests. International press-freedom organisations have repeatedly condemned the treatment she has received, describing it as part of a broader pattern in which security and propaganda laws are used to criminalise dissent.

Together, these cases show that the suppression of journalism is occurring through multiple pathways, from wartime violence to the use of national security laws against dissent. Regardless of the method, the result is the same: fewer independent voices able to scrutinise power and inform the public.

Early Warning Signs in Australia

While these examples occur abroad, early warning signs also appear within Australia. Recent developments indicate that pressures on free expression can still arise from legal and policy frameworks. In early 2026, the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, the country’s major journalists’ union, warned that proposed federal hate-speech legislation risked undermining core principles of press freedom and freedom of expression. It argued that broadly framed restrictions could have unintended consequences for reporting and commentary. Around the same time, two Australian teenagers, supported by a digital rights group, challenged the government’s planned social-media ban for under-16s in the High Court, arguing that it restricts the country’s implied constitutional freedom of political communication.

Public debates over censorship have also surfaced in cultural and literary spaces. In January 2026, Adelaide Writers’ Week was cancelled after more than a hundred invited authors withdrew in protest over the disinvitation of a scheduled speaker whose past comments had drawn controversy. Organisers said the decision was made to prevent further division. However, several writers and commentators described the episode as an example of censorship and a shrinking tolerance for contentious views in public forums.

These developments do not place Australia in the same category as authoritarian states that imprison journalists. However, they demonstrate how debates about security, hate speech and digital regulation can still shape the boundaries of public discussion in democratic societies. The gradual narrowing of space for contentious or controversial expression often occurs through legal and institutional mechanisms rather than overt repression. For this reason, democracies must remain attentive to how regulatory frameworks affect journalism and public debate, particularly as governments increasingly attempt to manage online information environments.

Defending Press Freedom in Practice

Responding to the global decline of press freedom requires more than statements of concern. Democracies already have tools that can be used more consistently. Initiatives such as the Media Freedom Coalition, launched by the United Kingdom and Canada in 2019 and now supported by more than fifty countries, including Australia, coordinate diplomatic pressure and raise cases of imprisoned journalists. International organisations have also developed mechanisms to protect reporters. For example, UNESCO’s Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists has encouraged more than thirty countries to establish national systems to investigate attacks on journalists and improve legal protections.

Financial support is equally important. Democracies can support press-freedom organisations that assist journalists facing persecution. Funding emergency assistance programmes run by groups such as Reporters Without Borders, Committee to Protect Journalists, and the International Women’s Media Foundation helps provide legal aid, safety support, and relocation assistance for threatened reporters. These programmes allow journalists forced to flee harassment, imprisonment, or violence to continue reporting from safer locations, ensuring that independent reporting does not disappear when governments attempt to silence it.

The decline of press freedom is therefore not only a problem for journalists. It shapes how societies understand events, hold governments accountable, and respond to crises. For this reason, democracies cannot treat attacks on journalism abroad as distant issues. Speaking out against repression, supporting independent media organisations, and providing protection to persecuted journalists are practical steps that can help sustain the global flow of reliable information. If democratic governments value transparency and open debate, defending press freedom must remain a consistent priority rather than an occasional response to crises.

Akshit Tyagi is an intern at Australian Outlook at the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is a postgraduate student in International Relations at the Australian National University in Canberra and holds a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration and a Postgraduate Diploma in Journalism. He previously worked as a business reporter in New Delhi and has written for The Canberra Times, Woroni (ANU student media), The Hill, and other publications.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Introduction

As US nuclear demand propels forward, Australia, a nation that holds one-third of the world’s uranium supplies, is well-positioned to meet US energy demands and strengthen the credibility of Australian uranium exports. In 2021, Australian uranium provided 15% of US imports, accounting for half of total Australian exports. Revitalizing this crucial energy supply chain, Trump’s planned $500 Billion Stargate AI Infrastructure project plans the construction of data centers and infrastructure to support the power solution for AI processing power expansion. 

This comes one year since Trump passed Executive Order 14156 on January 20, 2025, to “reform nuclear reactor testing at the Department of Energy,” an order which indicated the United States needs “reliable, diversified, and affordable energy to drive development of advanced technologies.” The Trump Administration additionally wants to increase US Nuclear Capacity to 400 Gigawatts by 2050, from 100 gigawatts today. In 2025, 20 metric tons of “high-assay low-enriched” uranium (HALEU) was slated to be released into a fuel bank for the US AI infrastructure. 

Reviewing Australia’s Cyclical Nuclear Relationship 

Spearheading the AI boom and subsequent data center development is Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI, who has a side startup on nuclear fusion for powering AI data centers. By 2030, the consumption of data centers for AI models is set to double, consuming a total of 9% of US power. Energy ambitions by US companies like OpenAI drive significant leverage in US lobbying to secure an optimized US nuclear process in the tech race against China. 

Concerning nuclear exports, Australia’s large Uranium and Thorium reserves are well positioned to supply the “Five Eyes” nations (AUS, CAN, NZ, UK, US) with critical minerals, due to their democratically aligned governments, a strategic maneuver for US energy demands, and critical mineral security. However, Australia’s nuclear energy development remains heavily restricted. During the 2025 national election, the Liberal Party advocated for nuclear energy as a more sustainable alternative to green energy, while Labor argued that nuclear power is “too vague,” and supported burning fossil fuels until 2050, with a transfer to “renewable energy.” Additionally, growth in the Australian uranium export sector hinges on extraneous regulations in national environmental safeguards, such as the EBPC Act.  

Legislative barriers to nuclear energy 

Despite the economic benefits of increased trade between the US and Australia, Australian uranium is regulated under a strict system of institutional bureaucracy. Australia has been a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) since 1971, as part of an international standard-setting initiative for economic and social well-being.

Subsequently, under the 1977 Non-Proliferation Treaty, assurances must be guaranteed that exported uranium doesn’t benefit the development of nuclear weapons or be used in military programs. This is monitored as Australian-Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM) with coverage from IAEA safeguards, security requirements, and consent to transfer AONM to third parties with enrichment beyond 20% of U-235, to monitor where mined Australian nuclear material is used, and AONM compliance is adhered to for peaceful proliferation. 

Australia, under the policy, retains the right to be selective with the export of AONM to nations and further tighten export policy as per the IAEA protocol, alongside strengthened safeguards. Focused on managing Australian nuclear minerals, the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) forum ensures transparency and efficiency with the supply of Australian uranium. While maintaining the policing of Australian nuclear material overseas, the MCA supports an amendment to the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999., (EPBC), that radiological impact regulations in paragraphs (1A)(a) to (1A)(f), applying “only to actions that are part of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency.” 

The MCA argues that “while the definition of ‘nuclear’ is very clear within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Nuclear Safety and Security Glossary, there is no recognised international standard for a ‘radiological exposure action’. This will lead to the EPBC Act capturing a range of actions well beyond those linked to nuclear fission or fusion. Further, the MCA argues that the Environmental Offset Policy under EPBC adds administrative complexity to mineral industry development and fails to guarantee environmental outcomes, calling for a redefinition of the “net gain test” in environmental offset as a whole, rather than individual actions in the industry. 

This support is consistent with a 2023 defense legislation amendment to support an Australian acquisition of US Virginia-class nuclear submarines under the AUKUS agreement, poised to restore Australian domestic energy capacity. In 2019, the Parliamentary Committee investigated the potential for nuclear energy in Australia.  Ted O’Brien, the chair of the opposition energy spokesman, called for the Federal moratorium on Generation III, Generation IV reactors, and small modular reactors (SMRs). This effort culminated in the Uranium Mining and Nuclear Facilities Repeal Bill in 2019, which was terminated in the 2025 State Election. As nuclear energy mobilization continues to be obstructed, the Australian energy sector will continue to be surpassed by allies and non-allied nations. 

Significant potential exists for the Australian energy sector, especially with the rise of energy-hungry AI models and tools; however, it must be realized in the mining, enrichment, and application of our most valuable energy export, uranium. Canberra should refocus on streamlining restrictions of the Nuclear Energy Ban of 1998 to accommodate the expansion of private reactors in Australia, under a defined framework for domestic energy production, while adhering to environmental regulations. The modification of EBPC offers a pragmatic and scalable approach to meeting exploding global power demands and investment in peaceful nuclear energy proliferation. 

James Fraser is currently pursuing a degree in International Relations at George Mason University. His academic focus lies in security and intelligence issues within the South Pacific region.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Australia’s renewed focus on defence capability and personnel wellbeing is welcome. Yet one significant factor shaping personnel performance remains largely unaddressed: family separation during deployment.

Research led by the Monash Global Peace and Security (GPS) Centre and funded by Global Affairs Canada as part of the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations has identified family separation as one of the key challenges for personnel with caring responsibilities deploying to UN peace operations, impacting wellbeing, mental health, and performance in peace operations.

Interviews with peacekeepers by Monash GPS reveal this is a significant issue that warrants greater attention and investment. Addressing it would improve the experiences of deployed personnel, enhance operational effectiveness by reducing stressors, and encourage more personnel, particularly women, to deploy.

What Is The Issue?

For peacekeepers, caring responsibilities do not stop when they are away. Many describe the additional work required to manage and fulfil their caring responsibilities while away, including maintaining regular contact and a daily routine, and the resources needed to organise care in their absence.

The research found that family separation affects the well-being and mental health of peacekeepers and can also strain their relationships. The stress of being away from their family is often compounded by working in a high-pressure environment.

It can lead to feelings of guilt about being absent and distracted at work. Many feel anxious when they are unable to communicate frequently due to work schedules, time differences, unstable internet, or a lack of private spaces. One British military officer explains: “That emotional guilt starts to kick in as well: Have I done the right thing [going] on tour…[or] being in the army? Am I doing the right thing staying in the army?”

In addition, many peacekeepers are unable to travel home during their rest and recuperation (R&R) period, either due to financial constraints, distance or insufficient time to travel home and back to the mission. One peacekeeper at the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) recalls a colleague who was stressed and “crying every day” because she could not afford a ticket home to see her children.

According to a military officer at UNHQ, the “anxiousness of not being able to communicate is harder than actually being absent.” To overcome this, some peacekeepers have found innovative ways to remain engaged with their families at home. For instance, peacekeepers in the UN mission in Cyprus report that having access to video games while on the mission helped them bond with their children while away.

Who Does It Impact?

Although separation from families impacts personnel regardless of their gender, our research finds that women are expected to continue the bulk of care work while deployed. In interviews with Monash GPS, female peacekeepers describe organising and managing care while away, including childcare and medical appointments for older family members. They also describe guilt and social stigma for being away from their children.

Separation also impacts the family members at home. For instance, partners or other family members may assume additional caregiving responsibilities, and relationships may be strained, potentially leading to divorce upon peacekeepers’ return. It can also affect children’s well-being, as they may “grow up without one parent who is always in the field,” says a staff member at UNMISS. Several peacekeepers, both men and women, share instances in which their children grew distant and “don’t want to speak to me anymore” (male police officer at the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)). Some also face challenges with their children’s behaviour and education.

What Can Be Done About It?

Australia and other troop and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs), as well as the UN, can improve support for personnel to manage their caring responsibilities while deployed and reduce the negative impacts of family separation. First, include care in pre-deployment training to help personnel and their families prepare for separation and know what support is available.

Additionally, during deployment, T/PCCs should ensure access to reliable internet and private spaces. Leadership should also ensure personnel have a regular time to call home. Additional support can be provided to return home during R&R, including covering travel time and increasing financial support for those on longer deployments.

Support can also include education packages, healthcare and financial assistance for care in their absence. For instance, to increase the number of women deploying to peace operations, Uruguay has introduced a family grant scheme to assist with educational expenses during deployment, enabling parents to cover school transportation or access tutoring. While other peacekeepers interviewed by Monash GPS suggest that increasing access to psychosocial services in the mission will help manage stress, support personnel’s mental health and well-being, and destigmatise self-care and help-seeking..

There are also ways T/PCCs can support returning peacekeepers, including providing guidance and assistance to help personnel and their families with reintegration and reconnection, and access to counselling and family support services.

Benefits of Addressing the Issue

Addressing the stress of family separation among deployed personnel will mitigate negative mental and physical health outcomes. This reduces the risk of negative coping mechanisms, burnout, depression, and harmful behaviours (towards the self or others), and promotes self-care and wellbeing, which, participants noted, “in turn positively impacts their performance, commitment, and job satisfaction” (according to one research participant).

Supporting personnel in managing family separation is not a peripheral or private matter. Rather, it is central to performance, retention and operational success. Institutions that take care seriously are better placed to build a capable, diverse, and resilient workforce.

Lauren Lowe is a PhD candidate in the School of Social Sciences at Monash University, Australia, examining gender and Kosovo’s peace process. She is also a research officer at the Monash Global Peace and Security (GPS) Centre researching women’s participation in peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

While listening to Canadian Prime Minister Carney’s speech in Davos, I was reminded of Plato’s seminal work, ‘The Republic.’ In this piece, we are introduced to the character Thrasymachus, who counters Socrates’s notion that cooperation is necessary for all endeavours of a state. Here Thrasymachus defiantly proclaims, “might is right, justice the interest of the stronger: now praise me!” What better metaphor for the state of the current world order than this literary battle between philosophers? For decades, the international order rested on a Socratic renunciation of “might is right”, at least in theory. We operated on (what appeared to be) a shared respect for international law and the dignity inherent in humanity. This system had its flaws and hypocrisies, but, in its most basic sense, liberalism had bested realism in shaping the global political landscape through institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations, the Pax Americana, and the European Union. Through these guiderails, the international order remained stable, prosperous and relatively peaceful. We were all Socrates, calmly putting the defiant Thrasymachus in his place. But has the realist Thrasymachus truly been bested? Have our Socratic institutions overcome the brutality of his ideology?

As of the 23rd of January 2026, US President Donald Trump has walked back his recent tariff threats to European allies and withdrawn his recent tariff threats against European allies. These tariffs were an escalation of an already volatile situation in response to threats of a US annexation of Greenland.  After significant pushback from leaders around the world, Trump has instead asked for discussions of a new NATO “framework” that would grant the United States “total access” to territory. While this sudden de-escalation on the American side may have temporarily eased fears of armed conflict, world leaders have made it clear that catastrophic damage to the post-war status quo has already been done.

Simply put: the world is waking up to the possibility that Thrasymachus may have been correct.

Just 20 years ago, this notion would have been unthinkable to many in the world of mainstream international relations. This is a renunciation of faith, a heretical questioning of our basic operational principles. And yet here we stand on the precipice of history, fearfully gazing down at the chasm below, terrified of its gnawing maw full of war, imperialism, xenophobia, and naked Darwinism. Signs show that Australia is aware of this fracturing of the global status quo. Treasurer Jim Chalmers has said that Carney’s speech was “widely shared and discussed” within the Australian government, and that new trade talks between the EU and Australia point to interest in new alliances.

The illusion of liberalism has been shattered. Realism, as its name implies, is the cold, hard truth of reality – it is raw power. Liberalism and cooperation are, by contrast, constructions. They can exist only if individuals and global powers recognise their value. And to this, I say we must continue to believe, despite the shattering of our old hopes.

The world is now at a crossroads where collapsing entirely into a realism framework may feel attractive. However, doing so would be to give up one of the greatest and most prosperous experiments in human history. It was the cooperative liberal post-war era that gave many Western countries one of the longest periods of relative peace and prosperity in recent history. We must not allow ourselves to throw away this spirit of cooperation, along with all its abundance, when strong powers preach of its supposed inevitable decline. If we find our Socrates to be weak and incoherent in his old age, we must resist the urge to run into the welcoming arms of the realist Thrasymachus. The truth is that a return to realism will benefit only the global superpowers. Smaller states will be forced to hedge or bandwagon, regardless of whether such capitulation serves their interests.

If Australia is to avoid this fate, it must strengthen ties with nations that still uphold the cooperative spirit by forging closer ties with the European Union, Commonwealth nations, and regional states. This will, of course, be a shock to the system. Australian foreign policy has relied on the security and economic guarantees of the United States and the post-war order for decades. Indeed, it can be somewhat difficult to find an analysis of Australian foreign policy that does not hinge entirely on American hegemony. However, as uncomfortable as it may seem and as daunting as it sounds, this new world necessitates that Australia forge ahead without the permanent aid of America and the post-war order. Those old systems have collapsed, and new ones must be created.

Australia’s sovereignty and wellbeing are at stake. Protecting them will require belief in the cooperative spirit, which, now fragile, must be carefully nurtured. Canberra, Brussels, London, members of the Commonwealth, and nations in the Indo-Pacific now need each other more than at any other point in the last 80 years. Mutual defence treaties and free trade agreements should thus be a priority. If the superpowers return to realist imperialism, smaller and medium-sized states must form stronger bonds to protect their sovereignty and interests.

The world must tread carefully now. The Titans have been released from Tartarus, and without careful action going forward, we may doom ourselves to gaze out fearfully as the Powerful gleefully bellow the echoing words of Thrasymachus: “Might is right, justice the interest of the stronger: now praise me!”

Alexandra Desailly is an Australian Outlook Intern at the Australian Institute of International Affairs National Office. She is one of thirty selected for the Young Australians in International Affairs (YAIA) Emerging Leaders Dialogues and the winner of the YAIA Policy Pitch Competition. She holds a Bachelor of International Studies with Distinction from UNSW;  her work focuses on European current affairs, national security, and diplomacy.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Across the world, governments, including the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and China, are rediscovering the strategic value of domestic manufacturing and tightening supply chains in key sectors such as semiconductors, advanced technologies, and critical minerals. Manufacturing is seen as national insurance against uncertainty. India’s focus on domestic production reflects this changing mindset.

A Global Turn Toward Industrial Security

This pattern is not unique to India. In the United States, policymakers and industry groups are strengthening domestic semiconductor capacity through large-scale investments and international supply-chain partnerships. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s roughly $165 billion expansion in Arizona shows how government incentives translate to advanced chip production on U.S. soil, while broader initiatives such as Pax Silica seek to coordinate allied countries to secure semiconductor and AI technology supply chains beyond national borders. The emphasis ensures both economic competitiveness and that critical technologies, from semiconductors to artificial-intelligence hardware, remain available during geopolitical or trade disruptions. A bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers introduced legislation in January 2026 to establish a $2.5 billion stockpile of critical minerals, aimed at stabilising prices, supporting domestic mining and refining, as policymakers view foreign dependence as a national vulnerability rather than merely an economic issue. European Union leaders, including key representatives from Italy, France and Germany, are focused on reducing dependence on foreign raw materials and reviving manufacturing, even as a recent European Court of Auditors report warned that the bloc remains ‘dangerously dependent’ on external suppliers for critical materials required in strategic sectors. Large subsidy programs and regulatory incentives in the EU are being directed toward green technology, battery production, and advanced chips. In 2025, the European Commission approved €920 million in state aid for a new semiconductor plant in Germany under its Chips Act framework, reflecting concerns regarding overreliance on external suppliers.

In East Asia, Japan is expanding its domestic semiconductor industry. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) plans to produce 3-nanometre chips in Kumamoto, southern Japan, with an investment of approximately $17 billion amid rising demand for AI chips. Japan and the United States are discussing joint projects to secure critical materials, such as synthetic diamonds used in advanced manufacturing, as part of broader efforts to reduce dependence on China. South Korea’s semiconductor exports have also surged in early 2026, with shipments expected to grow by roughly 70 per cent year-on-year, highlighting the strength of its manufacturing base as the government promotes long-term plans focused on domestic production. China, meanwhile, has intensified its push for technological self-reliance as it enters its 2026-2030 Five-Year planning cycle. China has emphasised tightening export controls and safeguarding supply-chain resilience to reduce dependence on foreign technology, with the Ministry of Commerce naming enhanced export control rules and risk prevention among its top priorities for 2026. This aligns with the 15th Five-Year Plan’s broader focus on capability building and self-reliance in key industries, such as semiconductors.

Can Self-Reliance Be Sustained?

A renewed push for domestic manufacturing, along with tariffs, subsidies, and the relocation of supply chains closer to home, has downsides. Producing goods locally leads to higher costs as labour, electricity, and raw materials are typically more expensive than imported inputs. According to a report on global supply chains, tariffs increase the prices of critical components and materials, particularly in industries such as metals and electronics. Consequently, many companies are rethinking where they source their supplies and are prioritising long-term stability over short-term cost savings. A 2025 McKinsey & Company survey of global supply-chain leaders found that about 82 per cent of respondents said tariff changes have affected their supply chains, while 39 per cent reported higher supplier and material costs as a direct result. Companies, therefore, have to rethink where they source parts and pursue longer-term stability through dual sourcing or deeper supplier mapping.

Consumers may also feel the effects. A report from the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply (CIPS) warns that rising shipping and logistics costs, driven by transport delays and ongoing supply-chain instability, could increase prices for goods such as computers, electrical equipment, and transport machinery in 2026. According to procurement managers, these rising costs are already influencing business plans and expected price increases. In the United States, the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing survey reported that tariff uncertainty and higher input costs have weakened manufacturing conditions and complicated production planning.

India’s push to strengthen manufacturing is part of a wider global shift. Countries are not closing their markets. They are rethinking their spending on foreign suppliers in an uncertain global environment. Expanding domestic industries is seen as reducing risk and enhancing stability in addition to creating jobs. However, complete self-sufficiency is neither realistic nor always affordable. The main challenge for governments is to strike a practical balance by supporting key domestic industries while remaining connected to global trade networks that continue to drive growth and innovation.

Akshit Tyagi is an intern at Australian Outlook at the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is a postgraduate student in International Relations at the Australian National University, Canberra, and holds a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration as well as a Postgraduate Diploma in Journalism. He previously worked as a business reporter in New Delhi and has written for The Canberra Times, Woroni (ANU student media), The Hill, and other publications.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Southeast Asia stands at a digital turning point. From Vietnam’s fast-growing e-commerce platforms and Indonesia’s fintech surge to Singapore’s world-class innovation infrastructure, the region is rapidly moving online. Southeast Asia’s internet economy reached approximately US$263 billion in gross merchandise value (GMV) in 2024 – a 15 percent year-on-year increase driven largely by digital services and online retail. Yet behind this impressive headline figure lies a complex reality: wide disparities in regulatory readiness, data governance, and institutional capacity continue to limit the region’s ability to capture the benefits of digital trade fully. For ASEAN, the key question then is not which external model – US, European, or Chinese – to adopt, but which digital frameworks can realistically work for Southeast Asia’s developmental diversity and how to localize global norms to regional realities.

The Development Gap Beneath the Digital Boom

Despite the dynamism of the digital economy, the region’s developmental asymmetries are stark. There is significant variation among ASEAN member states in frameworks for cross-border data flows, e-payments, digital identity, and cybersecurity. While Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand have relatively mature digital trade ecosystems, others, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, still lack foundational infrastructure and harmonized data regimes.

The region’s rapidly expanding digital services trade is also constrained by regulatory fragmentation, limited SME readiness, and mismatched bilateral or regional rules. These structural obstacles reveal a sobering truth: adopting “high standard” digital trade agreements modeled on those of advanced economies will not automatically yield results. Without the infrastructure, interoperability, and institutional coherence to support them, such frameworks risk becoming symbolic rather than transformative.

Modularity, Regional Coherence, and Integration: Lessons from Within

Some Southeast Asian countries already have working models of flexible, modular integration with external partners, which could lay the groundwork for regional cooperation. For example, the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) – initially signed by Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand – pioneered a “modular architecture” that allows members to adopt specific policy modules (such as e-invoicing, digital identity, or AI ethics) as their systems mature.

This scalable approach is particularly suited to ASEAN’s context, enabling countries at different stages of digital readiness to engage meaningfully without overcommitting. DEPA’s strength also lies in its emphasis on interoperability and trust-based governance: it combines trade liberalization with forward-looking digital principles, such as data innovation, consumer protection, and ethical AI. By linking regulatory cooperation with digital inclusion goals, DEPA bridges the gap between innovation and governance, offering a realistic model for Southeast Asia’s evolving digital economy.

Building on this, the forthcoming ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) – expected to be concluded and signed in 2026 – represents a transformational step toward regional digital integration. DEFA aims to establish legally binding, interoperable digital trade rules across all ASEAN member states, focusing on cross-border data flows, digital payments, consumer protection, cybersecurity, digital ID systems, and emerging technologies such as AI governance and 5G interoperability.

The World Economic Forum (May 2025) estimates that DEFA could double ASEAN’s digital economy to US$2 trillion by 2030 if these measures are effectively implemented. Taken together, DEFA and DEPA mark a turning point: ASEAN is evolving from a rule-taker in the digital economy to a rule-shaper, advancing a homegrown, pragmatic, and modular approach to digital trade that reflects the region’s diversity and development realities.

The ASEAN Single Window (ASW) exemplifies this emerging pragmatism. As an integrated digital platform connecting the National Single Windows (NSWs) of all ASEAN member states, the ASW facilitates real-time, paperless trade by enabling customs and traders to exchange electronic documents such as certificates of origin and customs declarations. This has shortened clearance times, reduced costs, and fostered transparency across borders.

Beyond efficiency gains, the ASW strengthens ASEAN’s bargaining power in global digital trade governance. Creating shared standards for data exchange, cybersecurity, and digital authentication allows the region to articulate collective positions on cross-border data flows and digital trust frameworks rather than negotiating as fragmented markets. The ASW’s success also serves as proof of concept for deeper regional integration, bolstering ASEAN’s credibility as an emerging “digital middle power” and positioning it to shape global norms toward interoperability rather than fragmentation.

China’s Digital Trade Model: A Template with Tradeoffs

Although the US and EU digital frameworks are influential globally, China’s model is most directly comparable for ASEAN because it is the one ASEAN is actually integrated with, actively exposed to, and politically and economically closest to adopting in practice. China already has deep digital, supply chain, investment, and platform economy linkages with ASEAN: Chinese platforms (Alibaba, JD, TikTok, Tencent) are dominant players in Southeast Asia’s digital markets, and China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner and a major investor in digital infrastructure (cloud, data centres, 5G, cross-border payments). Because of this integration, ASEAN is subject to the Chinese digital governance model in its daily operations, not just at the treaty level.

Nonetheless, China’s digital governance model should serve as a caution to ASEAN as well. Beijing’s Cybersecurity Law (2017), Data Security Law (2021), and Personal Information Protection Law (2021) form a triad that enforces stringent data localization and cross-border transfer controls, giving authorities broad discretion over what data can leave China. These measures raise compliance costs for foreign firms and could embed state-centric digital norms globally. Through its Digital Silk Road initiative, Beijing is exporting these standards via infrastructure projects, telecom networks, and AI governance dialogues. This approach risks locking partner economies into Chinese technical ecosystems and regulatory dependencies.

For ASEAN, China’s model represents one pathway – particularly for members prioritizing security, state capacity, and sovereign control over sensitive digital assets. But it also highlights necessary trade-offs. Tighter controls can strengthen resilience and public trust, yet they may also pose challenges for interoperability, cross-border digital services, and the open data flows that ASEAN seeks to expand. As the region works to design frameworks that balance security with economic integration, China’s experience offers valuable insights into how different regulatory choices shape outcomes for innovation, governance, and international cooperation.

From Dependence to Co-Design

If ASEAN is to articulate a distinctive digital trade model, two interlocking design principles must anchor it: adaptability and interoperability. Adaptability recognizes the region’s markedly heterogeneous levels of development and institutional capacities. ASEAN comprises both digital frontrunners with advanced regulatory systems and high-speed infrastructure, and economies still in the early stages of digitization. A viable model must therefore accommodate different levels of commitment, allowing member states to sequence participation, adopt rules in modules, and expand engagement as readiness improves. Adaptability also means recognizing that political priorities shift – data governance regimes mature, cybersecurity risks evolve, and new technologies (AI, cross-border cloud, digital IDs) emerge. A flexible rulebook enables ASEAN states to upgrade commitments over time rather than be locked into rigid, one-size-fits-all obligations.

Interoperability ensures that national systems – ranging from privacy protection frameworks to digital payment rails and identity verification regimes – can speak to one another. Without it, digital trade remains fragmented and inefficient. Many ASEAN states are already investing in cross-border QR payment connectivity, real-time settlement linkages, e-trade documentation platforms, and data-sharing frameworks for trusted government-to-government and business-to-government exchanges. These emerging systems could form the technical backbone of a regionally coherent, globally connected digital architecture. Interoperability also extends to aligning ASEAN rules with international norms, enabling the region to plug into broader digital markets without sacrificing its autonomy.

From these principles, ASEAN could develop a Digital Partnership Toolkit – a practical, operational framework designed to help countries translate aspiration into action. Such a toolkit would provide a menu of modular policy options, allowing governments to adopt specific elements at their own pace; capacity-building roadmaps tailored to each country’s regulatory maturity; and sequencing strategies that show how states can progress from foundational reforms to more advanced commitments. Informed by DEPA’s modular approach, DEFA’s regional ambition, and national digital diagnostics, the toolkit would ensure that digital trade rules are doable, not dreamy – regionally owned, context-sensitive, and globally credible, offering a uniquely Southeast Asian pathway to digital economic integration.

A Future Built, Not Borrowed

Southeast Asia’s digital future will not be imported from Silicon Valley or Beijing – it will be built in Jakarta, Hanoi, Manila, and Bangkok, by regulators drafting pragmatic laws, startups scaling regionally, and institutions learning to govern technology in real time. The region’s goal is not technological rivalry but strategic self-definition: crafting a digital order that serves its people and reflects its diversity.

If ASEAN succeeds in consolidating its frameworks for digital trade – flexible, inclusive, and regionally coherent – it could emerge as a standard-setter from the middle, offering the world a model of digital governance that is both ambitious and achievable. In an era where the digital divide risks becoming a geopolitical fault line, Southeast Asia’s “built, not borrowed” approach offers a rare and realistic path toward a trusted, open, and equitable digital future.

Azira Ahimsa is the 2025 Rising Expert on Technology at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP). She holds an MSc in Defence, Development and Diplomacy from Durham University (2016), is ASEAN Co-Chair of the US ASEAN Young Professionals Association, and has served in digital trade roles at the Australian Trade and Investment Commission and the UK Department for Business and Trade in Jakarta.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Since the Second Trump administration released its National Security Strategy (NSS), analysts have observed notable shifts in tone and priorities. The document adopts more measured language regarding China, notably omitting the previous administration’s characterisation of Beijing as “the pacing threat.” Additionally, the strategy places greater emphasis on reasserting American influence within the Western Hemisphere.

However, while it does not describe China as “the pacing threat,” it demonstrates the US’s resolve to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region and geopolitical competition with China. The document notes that the Indo-Pacific will be at the center of geopolitical competition and that alliances in the region will serve as “the bedrock of security and prosperity.” It states the US will seek to maintain a regional balance of power and prevent “the emergence of dominant adversaries”—a clear reference to the Indo-Pacific, where China’s rapid military buildup is challenging existing power dynamics. The NSS aims to maintain this balance by sustaining US economic and military superiority while pressuring allies to enhance their defense capabilities.

Japan, which has worried about US isolationism and withdrawal from Asia since the beginning of the Trump administration, should now feel more at ease. It can be assured of sustained US presence, though it must continue developing its own defence capabilities—which it fully intends to do. Japan has already begun investing in emerging military technologies, including drones, unmanned vehicles, hypersonic missiles, and anti-drone systems. Japan may face pressure to spend at least 3.5 per cent of its GDP on defence, as the Trump administration has often demanded of its allies. The Japanese government understands it needs to spend considerably more to develop defence capabilities and must gain voter support to do so. Japanese voters grasp the severity of the security environment. However, the loss of seats for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in recent elections is considered linked to dissatisfaction over the misuse of taxpayers’ money, foreign assistance programs despite rising living costs, and immigration policies. The recent scandal involving the JICA hometown initiative, which was perceived as accepting immigrants, reflects voters’ dissatisfaction with the ruling party’s immigration policies. Therefore, the Japanese government will need to address concerns about political accountability and immigration policy, rather than defence policy, to secure public support.

Japan could offer more access to US forces in Japan, such as providing training facilities on Mageshima Island. In this way, Japan can insist on the strategic interest of the US forces in Japan due to its vital location within the First Island Chain.

Indeed, this perception of vitality will be important as the US shows signs of prioritisation in its actions abroad. The perception will determine which country the US will need to maintain a presence in to prevent domination by China. It will be the demarcation line of the sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In recognition of this, Japan should seek to place itself firmly inside the US sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific. The US could scale back the defence perimeter to Guam. For now, the US considers the US-Japan alliance vital. Military actions also show this. After Chinese and Russian bombers conducted joint patrols around Japan, the US and Japan conducted a joint patrol. Despite tensions between the US and Venezuela, the US deploys two aircraft carriers around Japan as of 22 December 2025; the only other region where the US deploys aircraft carriers is the Caribbean Sea. Although the White House denied it, reports suggested that a different version of the 2025 NSS proposed the idea of a “Core Five,” composed of the US, China, Russia, India, and Japan, to replace the G7.

The Chinese sphere of influence is beginning to take shape outside Japan, particularly in Southeast Asia. In most Southeast Asian countries, China has a stronger economic presence. China is involved in significant infrastructure projects, such as high-speed railways, in Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. China is the largest trading and investment partner for most Southeast Asian countries. China has also expanded military influence through joint exercises, arms sales, and access to bases. China conducts joint military exercises with most Southeast Asian states, is negotiating the sale of J-10 fighter jets to Indonesia despite maritime disputes in the South China Sea, and has built and gained access to Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. Malaysia has expressed opposition to external interference in the South China Sea, echoing Beijing’s narrative. Although ASEAN meetings express the importance of the settlement of maritime disputes in accordance with the UNCLOS, regional states refrain from expressing concerns when Chinese vessels harass Filipino vessels in the South China Sea.

It is likely that the US also recognises the Chinese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. President Trump did not attend ASEAN summit meetings during his first presidency, and the Biden administration did not actively respond to the expansion of Chinese influence either. The 2025 NSS does not mention Southeast Asia.

As the Chinese sphere of influence is forming in Southeast Asia, the US and Japan need to maintain at least the US sphere of influence around the Japanese archipelago. For this purpose, Japan needs to impress the US upon its strategic importance by increasing defence capabilities and considering how the geography and capability of Japan can be utilised for the defence of the US.

Japan needs to understand how the US defines vital interests worth defending in order to avoid being self-conceited about its strategic importance solely for its geography or defense capabilities. The Trump administration’s foreign policy priorities demonstrate that geographic proximity to adversaries alone does not determine where the US will commit resources; strategic value must be actively demonstrated and maintained. Japan must continuously reinforce its indispensability to US security interests through deeper military integration, expanded access to facilities, and robust defence spending. Only by remaining operationally vital can Japan ensure it stays firmly within the US sphere of influence as strategic priorities shift.

Daiki Tsuboi has a Master’s of Strategic Studies from the Australian National University and working experience in diplomacy.

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In the recent decade, the Asia-Pacific has unlocked new opportunities for the integration of Regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). While the multilateral trading system has faced significant challenges since the Doha Round stalled, the Asia-Pacific Region, specifically East Asia and Southeast Asia (ASEAN), has advanced its regional trade agenda unabated. Concurrently, the international tax agenda has reached its height through the development of OECD BEPS 2.0 and the ongoing UN Tax Framework Convention. Unfortunately, the Asia-Pacific region has not yet fully seized this momentum, despite clear signals that these developments warrant close observation and proactive engagement, especially to advance the integration of Asia’s regional tax affairs.

Without the contestation over the power and influence of the US and China, linked to the relationship between RCEP and CPTPP, Asia’s regional integration has fortunately become interconnected, mutually reinforcing soft-law and hard-law frameworks that have shaped contemporary trade and investment agreements. Yet as trade and investment become a mainstream element of the regional economic agenda, tax concerns continue to lag. Over the past decade, international tax reform has progressively influenced the global political economy, but Asia’s regionalism remains primarily anchored in trade and investment. Given the inevitable interconnection among trade, investment, and tax, Asia’s evolving economic architecture must consider regional tax matters.

At the international level, the emerging UN Tax Framework Convention, under construction from 2025 to 2027, marks a crucial development in the global tax order. This current situation is unusual, as it brings two major institutions, the OECD and the UN, into direct engagement over the future of global tax governance. Fundamentally, the debate over global tax battles between the OECD and the UN was shaped by the former’s initiatives, namely BEPS 1.0 and, more recently, BEPS 2.0 or the Global Tax Deal, whose operation does not necessarily reflect the priorities of Global South countries.

As a result, culminating in late 2023, significant attention has been directed toward global tax cooperation, particularly through the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which the African group pioneered. In this context, the UNGA adopted Resolution 78/2023, which endorsed a draft resolution for a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation. Given this circumstance, regional approaches now offer a necessary paradigm for global tax cooperation, with Africa serving as a leader.

Moreover, 2023 marked the first Latin American and Caribbean summit on an inclusive, sustainable, and equitable global tax order, which emphasised rethinking the means of achieving international tax cooperation and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In upholding the SDG mandate, regionalism is also taken into account in advancing policy coherence for taxation, regional cooperation, and economic development.  So, the question arises about Asia’s political standing, because the African and Latin American regions have already asserted their positions in global tax cooperation.

Today, the Asia-Pacific share of global GDP growth has surpassed that of Africa and Latin America combined. Unlike the African and Latin American regions, Asia’s economic miracle story and diverse economic style provide sufficient confidence to sustain its economic growth, primarily through trade and investment (FDI) agendas, while overlooking tax affairs. However, an over-reliance on generating growth solely through this trade and investment regime creates a potential pitfall: it risks generating inequitable growth, which could, in turn, lead to rising inequality both among and within countries.

One variable in Asia’s regional tax architecture delineates this reality: the expanding network of Bilateral Tax Treaties (BTTs) or Double Tax Agreements (DTAs). Hand in hand with Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), the tax treaty regime has fundamentally changed the Asian economic and business framework, specifically global supply chain landscapes. Indeed, the increase in DTAs has had a profound positive impact on trade performance, including in emerging markets such as Vietnam. However, within ASEAN, tax incentives are naturally driving competition among member states, a situation that instead challenges the commitment to ASEAN economic integration. It is largely attributable to the collectively insufficient policy consideration of double taxation relief and agreements among ASEAN member states.

One of the striking variables in the international tax cooperation is that, despite a fragmented geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, global tax affairs still foster interconnected collaboration between nation-states. In other words, every country, under uncertain circumstances, needs to ensure its rational fiscal budget, which is intertwined with those of other states. From the perspective of institutional tax and trade relations, the European Union serves as a strong example in international taxation, as its powers are directed at preserving the EU’s four freedoms and thus enforcing the common European single market. So, framing this through the lens of Asia’s messy inward multilateral trade competition and tomorrow’s global tax governance in regionalism, both prospects offer measurable, concrete reasons to glue Asia’s regional economic power dynamics. 

Within this background of inequitable growth concerns & regional power dynamics, Asia’s tax regional cooperation will play a pivotal role, ranging from representing Asia within the global institutional tax landscape to coordinating national tax, trade, and investment agendas.

While there is initiative for a regional tax agenda in Asia, including the recently established Asia Pacific Tax Hub by the Asian Development Bank, Asia’s attempts at progressive tax coordination & cooperation remain limited. Given this context, ASEAN, at the forefront of Asia’s multilateralism, appears to be the most viable platform for initiating broader, more progressive tax cooperation in the region, specifically through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Strategic Plan 2026–2030.

So, both the rise of Asia’s key mega FTAs, RCEP & CPTPP, and global tax multilateralism, with the ongoing UN Tax Framework Convention, create a powerful initiative. To capitalise on this momentum, the Asia region should rethink its priorities for tax matters, moving beyond professional and technical groups to establish a politically empowered, unified, policy-making institution that ensures these efforts strengthen regional power dynamics and promote equitable economic growth.

Andi Mohammad Ilham is a Graduate of the School of Government and International Relations, Griffith University. He is also a Tax Researcher at MMStax Consulting, Indonesia. His research area focuses on the International Political Economy of Global Tax Governance.

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The reaction to the Chinese ships within Australian society was hysterical. Described as stoking ‘an anxious nation’s worst fears’, one could be forgiven for thinking the long-standing fear of the yellow peril had come to bear. The move caused a fervent mixture of shock, panic and outrage. Australia’s commentariat derided the transit as ‘military brinkmanship’, ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and there were even suggestions of ‘sending [Australian] ships out’ to confront the PLA-N. The reaction was so widespread that the government was forced to take a stance, urging the public to remain ‘calm’ and suggested they ‘take a deep breath’, while opposition politicians criticised the government for being ‘weak’ on a ‘totemic issue’.

This hysteria was not an unpleasant by-product of the mission, but a calculated move designed to exploit Australia’s sense of security.

Australia has historically enjoyed a ‘relatively benign’ strategic environment, buttressed by extended American military deterrence. Not since World War II, more than 80 years ago, has a possible or actual adversary operated off Australia’s coast. Japanese submarines and warships lurking in the Pacific and Indian Oceans were the last near competitor to undertake that course. For that reason, Australians are unaccustomed to adversaries operating near their borders. This lack of confrontation has led to what maritime security expert Douglas Guilfoyle suggests is an Australian attitude of a ‘peaceable sphere’, defined by a ‘view that [conflict] occurs over there’ and as a result it ‘suddenly seems rather startling when the world comes to [Australia]’. 

This gap in Australian public memory, and Australia’s ‘peaceable sphere’ was a deliberate and important target of the manoeuvre.

The Chinese expedition sought to rile the angst and fear associated with a military exercise and provide Australians with a tangible experience of having an adversary close to their shores. The naval flotilla aimed to shatter the Australian perception of a ‘peaceable sphere’ and force a reflection within the public on Australia’s decision to conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. In doing so, Beijing hopes to use the weight of an anxious public to increase the pressure on the Australian government to withdraw from those exercises.

It’s no coincidence that China’s warships entered Australia’s EEZ, at precisely the same distances that Australia operates when it regularly conducts FONOPs in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. These moves are deeply unpopular in China, with Beijing condemning them as ‘provocation’ or a ‘threat to China’s territorial integrity’. Prior to the Chinese expedition of late February, however, these words were meaningless to the Australian public. Australians had no experience of an adversary proximate to their coastline to gauge or conceptualise China’s ill-feeling.

Since the naval expedition of late February, Australians now have that experience.

The Chinese expedition provides a previously lacking context to the Australian public and brings perspective to Chinese protests of ‘provocation’ over these exercises. Given the fallout within the public and Australian commentary of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, one might consider whether a resonant experience has been achieved by Beijing. Suddenly, ‘provocation’ doesn’t seem so outlandish.

The angst and uncertainty that results from the move also forces Australians to grapple with a series of questions that were once academic. Why are we conducting FONOPs? Do we need to conduct them? And if we found it so unpleasant, is this how the Chinese feel, given Australia has conducted at least four FONOPs in 2025?

The emphasis on public opinion becomes clear when viewed amongst the uniformity of narratives put forward by Chinese state-owned media organisations. The Global Times reported that ‘Australia should reflect on itself for its activities rather than feel nervous about Chinese vessels’. Another article cited a Chinese military expert who commented ‘if the legitimate PLA far seas drills hit the nerves of some countries, they should reflect: some countries have been frequently conducting military activities near China, including transits through the Taiwan Straits and into Chinese territorial waters’.

Similarly, Zhou Bo, a retired People’s Liberation Army Senior Colonel appeared on Australia’s public broadcaster the ABC and asked ‘Why would [Australian] ships sail so close to Chinese shore? What is the purpose of you sailing through the Taiwan Strait? There is not much business for you to go through there… ask yourself [why you are there], do some self-searching’.

The Chinese narrative demonstrates the visit was chiefly aimed at catalysing a reflection within Australian society regarding FONOPs. In this reflection, and in the unpleasantness associated with the visit, calls from within Australian society for a withdrawal from FONOPs grow louder, something China has repeatedly called for and is a long-term foreign policy goal of Beijing.

Such a strategy fits within China’s Three Warfares’ (三战)doctrine, a guiding PLA strategy that involves the targeting of public opinion, psychological warfare and legal warfare to protect and promote the interests of the Chinese Community Party. As former CIA analyst Peter Mattis observed, the strategy involves ‘influencing potentially threatening actors at their source to shape their thinking and actions’.

In visiting Australia, China attempts to influence Australia ‘at the source’, shaping its thinking and actions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. The naval flotilla was an attempt to provide the Australian public with an identifiable experience of FONOPs, bring into relief the Chinese experience and to reduce support for them by raising the fear and uncertainty associated with conflict. It leads Australia to an uncomfortable position the next time it considers returning to contested waters. Does Australia continue with FONOPs? And, if Australia found the Chinese visit so unpleasant, should it withdraw from them entirely? Such a goal would fit squarely within China’s strategy of ‘win without fighting’.

Oliver Sinclair is a lawyer and is studying a Masters of International Relations at the Australian National University.

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Fifteen years ago, Greenpeace exposed how Patrick Moore, once affiliated with the group, misused his past association to rebrand himself as an “environmentalist” while actively downplaying climate change. Seven years ago, Moore appeared repeatedly on Crowder’s channel to “debunk” climate science.

The pattern of climate denial is also revealing in who tends to drive it. Patrick Moore, Ben Shapiro, and Donald Trump: what unites them beyond their rhetoric? Wealth. It is well known that political conservatism is associated with a lower concern about climate change, but there is research to show that there is actually a greater polarisation amongst wealthier nations.  Climate skepticism is often amplified by those with deep ties to fossil fuel interests. Many deniers are less motivated by ignorance than by ideology and self-preservation. Casting doubt on science conveniently protects industries and donors whose profits would suffer from robust climate policy.

To add to the heat, social media creators are willfully ignoring evidence, exploiting scientific complexity, and reducing it into digestible soundbites. Why? YouTube alone may earn up to $13.4 million a year in ad revenue from channels pushing climate denial content. A report from the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH), The New Climate Denial, documents how these arguments evolve to stay relevant. Instead of outright denying climate change, skeptics now emphasise uncertainty, shift blame, or downplay urgency. This is not a passive ecosystem of ideas; it’s a business model that monetises doubt.

These videos are not carefully reasoned counterarguments, they are packaged with clickbait titles and a thin veneer of credentials. Our attention spans are now shorter than ever. Now, not only is it easy to feed on information without fact-checking, but it’s also rewarding to receive the instant gratification of approval from numerous like-minded strangers.

That profit motive underscores an uncomfortable truth: climate deniers aren’t naive. They are profiting from spreading misinformation and understand that a slick graphic or a confident voice on a podcast will often carry more weight than a technical research paper.

The social media rhetoric itself is slippery, shifting with the times. One of the most common tactics is to frame arguments in a way that feels factual but is deliberately narrow. Consider The Saltbush Club, which published an article citing climate scientist Bjørn Lomborg’s claim that more people die from cold than heat. Or the YouTube debate on skeptics v/s activists, with a credentialed physicist-epidemiologist blaming China. These arguments aren’t airtight, but they’re persuasive in context. They rely on selective data, obscure nuances, and the facade of expertise to present themselves as “sensible.”

In a world where visual simplicity beats dense scientific data, denial has the advantage.

Take Steven Crowder’s insistence that Antarctic ice sheets are growing. The claim contradicts mainstream science, but to his audience, it resonates because it’s easy to picture. Meanwhile, communicating the nuances of ice mass balance, satellite data, and seasonal variability requires patience and trust—two things in short supply online. If denial thrives on simplicity, then science needs to adapt—not by dumbing itself down, but by becoming more accessible.

This is where responsibility falls not just on scientists but on platforms. Stricter guidelines for the spread of misinformation are urgently needed. YouTube, Facebook, TikTok, and others must recognise that their algorithms reward polarisation. Leaving misinformation unchecked under the guise of “free speech” ignores the societal costs. After all, nearly 16% of Americans don’t believe in human-caused climate change; that’s about 49 million people. Those people vote. They influence policy. And when one of the most developed nations in the world can’t build consensus on basic science, global climate action stalls.

If denial thrives on simplicity, then our response must be clarity. Making science accessible isn’t about diluting it, it’s about opening the doors wider. Citizen-science programs, community-based climate education, and transparent public communication can transform passive observers into informed participants. Peer-reviewed research will always be the backbone of climate understanding, but the bridge between the lab and everyday life must be strengthened through compelling visual media, responsible journalism, and evidence-driven storytelling.

We have already crossed the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C limit, yet the urgency of that milestone is lost when scientific knowledge is concentrated among the few. Broadening access to education, economically, socially, and culturally, is one of the most effective ways to counter misinformation and ensure no community is left out of the solutions we desperately need. Climate action is not just a scientific challenge but a democratic one, and the path forward depends on empowering the public with the tools, the understanding, and the agency to demand better.

Ananya Sarma is pursuing a major in Environmental Science with a minor in Sustainable Development and International Relations at the Australian National University. Currently an intern with the AIIA’s Media and Communications team, she is passionate about bridging disciplines and writing on global and societal issues. Her experience across environmental and diplomatic sectors enables her to explore the intersections of sustainability, politics, and communication. As an Indian international student, she brings a global perspective to her work and is driven by curiosity, creativity, and a commitment to continuous learning.

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Among the Asian languages taught in Australia, Indonesian offers a particularly useful case study. It is geographically close, linguistically accessible, and strategically significant. Yet its teaching and learning patterns mirror the broader challenges of Asia capability in education: early enthusiasm followed by steep decline once the subject becomes an elective.

The Inquiry and the Indonesian Case

The current parliamentary inquiry invites submissions on how Australia can strengthen Asia capability across all sectors. While many contributions will focus on macro-level coordination — involving DFAT, Education, and state systems — the most direct impact lies where policy meets practice: in classrooms.

In the case of Indonesian, the issue is not whether the language matters, but how it is taught and experienced. In many schools lessons rely on ageing resources that do not reflect the Indonesia of today — an archipelago of innovation, creativity, and cultural vitality. Teachers work hard to make lessons meaningful, but often without the modern materials that can bridge the gap between textbook learning and contemporary Indonesia.

Policy discussions often highlight the need for Asian language proficiency, yet the conditions that shape classroom experience receive less attention. Curriculum frameworks alone cannot drive engagement. Students respond to relevance — to the sense that what they are learning connects with real people and contemporary culture. When classroom materials lag behind modern Indonesia, students are left learning about a static idea of a dynamic neighbour.

Formal Indonesian Still Matters

It would be easy to mistake this for an argument against traditional or formal Indonesian. It isn’t. As I wrote in Is Teaching Formal Indonesian Still Relevant?, formal Indonesian remains essential. It provides the structural backbone — the grammar, register, and discipline that allow learners to move confidently between settings, dialects, and styles of communication.

But language learning works best when that foundation is contextualised. Students need opportunities to see and hear the language in motion — to recognise its rhythm, humour, and warmth. Structured lessons form the scaffold, but the lived experience of the language, through film, sound, and cultural context, is what turns knowledge into capability.

Authentic exposure also builds empathy and understanding. A well-chosen video clip, street interview, or classroom scene can convey cultural norms — from how people greet elders to how they express modesty — in a way that textbook explanations can seldom capture. These are the moments that move students from memorising phrases to understanding meaning.

The Middle Years: Where Continuity is Won or Lost

Research and experience both show that the middle years — typically Years 7 and 8 — are where engagement in Asian languages begins to taper. When language learning becomes an elective, enrolments drop sharply. In From Sate to Sour: Why Indonesian Studies Lose Flavour After Year Eight, I noted that this transition often determines whether students persist or disengage.

What happens in these years matters enormously. If lessons feel meaningful and achievable, students continue. If they feel dated or disconnected, they don’t. This pattern has a cascading effect: fewer students in senior years mean smaller university cohorts and, ultimately, fewer future teachers. The result is a slow erosion of capability just when regional understanding is most needed.

Teachers often describe this as the “continuity cliff”. Students enter high school excited by the freshness of a new language, but by Year 8, other subjects compete for their attention. Keeping that curiosity alive requires resources that mirror students’ own media environment — visual, story-driven, and culturally current.

From Policy to Practice

The parliamentary inquiry is well placed to address this. Asia capability cannot be achieved through rhetoric alone. It depends on teachers who are confident, supported, and resourced to make language learning engaging and sustainable.

Improving classroom resources — especially those that combine structure with authenticity — is one of the most immediate and achievable steps. Teachers need lessons that are accurate, adaptable, and visually rich; students need to feel that what they’re learning connects to something real. When those conditions are met, participation stabilises and language study becomes part of a natural educational pathway, not an exception.

Equipping teachers with strong, classroom-ready materials also supports retention in the profession. A confident teacher — one who has access to high-quality tools and authentic content — is more likely to stay inspired and to sustain student interest across the school year.

Insights from Our Submission

In our submission to the parliamentary inquiry, Strengthening Indonesian Language Learning through Classroom Resources, we argue that improving resource quality is among the most practical levers available to strengthen Asia capability. While policy frameworks and recruitment pipelines are essential, the classroom is where capability is built day to day — and where it can falter when teachers lack contemporary materials.

The submission highlights that many Indonesian teachers still rely on outdated resources that fail to reflect the Indonesia their students see online — a nation of digital innovation, environmental leadership, and vibrant youth culture. To bridge this gap, our project, Pondok Bahasa, produces cinematic, curriculum-aligned lessons filmed in Indonesia. These resources model real communication, present diverse voices, and align with the Australian Curriculum, helping students connect linguistic structure with cultural authenticity.

Our recommendation is clear: make the renewal of Asian-language resources a national priority. Invest in materials that support teachers’ confidence and sustain student engagement through the middle years. Doing so will not only improve continuity in Indonesian but strengthen the long-term supply of teachers and graduates who can deepen Australia’s regional literacy.

A Shared Investment

Australia’s Asia capability will be defined not by policy ambition alone but also by what happens in classrooms — by whether teachers have the tools to inspire curiosity and confidence, and whether students feel a sense of connection to the region they are learning about.

As the inquiry considers its findings, it should recognise that the most effective reforms often begin with small, practical shifts. Renewing classroom resources, investing in teacher capability, and building continuity through the middle years may not make headlines, but they are the quiet foundations on which deeper regional understanding depends.

Andrew Catton is an Educational Content Specialist at Pondok Bahasa and a registered Indonesian, English, and Humanities teacher.

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Introduction

Meloni is not only the leader of the right-wing, nationalist, and conservative Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia – FdI), but also heads a coalition with Forza Italia and the Lega. This coalition secured Palazzo Chigi with 43.79% of the vote in an election where turnout barely exceeded 64%. Her government took office amidst considerable adversity: an economy only just emerging from two years of pandemic and a nationwide state of emergency, coupled with the complexities of the two ongoing wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East. The domestic and international context thus presented immediate and daunting challenges.

Political consolidation, economic performance, and international engagement. Three key dimensions that make the Meloni government worth analyzing, both for its past outcomes and for what it may signal about Italy’s future trajectory.

Domestic Consolidation

Italy had not had a right-wing government since 2011, under the controversial Silvio Berlusconi. After him, governments have alternated between technocratic administrations, centre-left coalitions, and a national unity government led by economist Mario Draghi during the COVID-19 pandemic (February 2021 – October 2022).

At the 2022 elections, FdI achieved 26% of the vote. Since then, the party’s approval rating has not only remained stable but increased to 42%, prompting speculation about a renewed mandate for the Meloni-led coalition at the 2027 election. Given the centre-right’s ten-year absence from power, Meloni’s rise was quickly seen as an experiment, even an anomaly, with early expectations that her government would soon collapse. However, two factors should be considered: first, the natural political cycle that alternates between centre-left and centre-right, and second, the combination of the left-led government during the COVID crisis. What was perceived as poor pandemic and economic management clearly fueled the rise of the right in Italy’s political landscape. Today, the party’s consolidation among voters is reflected in its strong performance in regional elections: currently, ahead of this month’s regional contests, the center-right governs 13 out of Italy’s 20 regions, with the country now broadly “blue”.

Regardless of the color of the coalition, however what is unusual is the length of the government. This is significant, as political stability enables real policy implementation allowing for a long-term vision and finally, its results.

Economic Performance

Following 4.8% GDP growth in 2024—residual momentum from the post-COVID European Recovery Plan (PNRR)—Italy’s GDP stabilized at 0.7% in 2023 and 2024. OECD projections indicate a slowdown to 0.6% in 2025, before returning to 0.7%. Several factors have constrained growth: persistently weak labour productivity, stagnating wages, declining industrial output (notably in the automotive sector), exposure to US trade policies targeting EU goods, and volatility in international energy prices feeding through to consumer prices. Offsetting these pressures are a steady decline in unemployment—now at 6%, the lowest since before the global financial crisis—and the ongoing boost from the European Recovery Plan.

The Meloni government claims credit for fiscal consolidation, recording a deficit below 3% and returning within EU budgetary criteria, the Stability and Growth Pact. This discipline received a positive response from markets, as ratings agencies upgraded Italy’s creditworthiness in recognition of enhanced fiscal prudence.

As political stability, Italy’s economic discipline comes as a surprise too. However, this might not be enough, in a global context where a nation’s survival seems to require defence spending, new technologies investments, green transition and a general resilience to external threats and international instability.

International Engagement

From the outset, Giorgia Meloni has exhibited strong international engagement, replacing sovereigntist rhetoric with pragmatic diplomacy aimed at promoting Italian national interests. Among European actors, she has become a reliable interlocutor, cultivating cordial ties with the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen (who praised the Italy-Albania migrant processing model and proposed to other countries to adopt and implement it as well). To be fair, however, this is also due to the political instability (and economic recession) that has affected France and, until a few months ago, Germany.

Transatlantic relations have seen substantial alignment with US President Donald Trump – a relationship that Meloni regards for elevating Italy’s influence in Europe. Emblematically, she was the only European leader who was invited to Trump’s second inauguration in January. Surely, the two leaders have much in common: their pragmatic and deal-oriented attitude, civil and social stand, their conservative and anti-establishment rhetoric. In short, the relationship between Rome and Washington remains strong, marking one fundamental pillar of Italy’s foreign policy.

Nevertheless, this privileged status offers no immunity from external pressures: at the NATO summit in June, Meloni announced a 3% increase in defence and security spending over a decade, with a notable emphasis on border control, irregular migration, and critical infrastructure. The renaming of the Ministry for Ecological Transition to the Ministry for the Environment and Energy Security, which now oversees energy security, is emblematic of these priorities.

Finally, one of Meloni’s most ambitious diplomatic initiatives has been the comprehensive partnership engagement with Africa through the Mattei Plan—a national-interest strategy aiming to position Italy as a bridge between Europe, Africa and the Middle East, and restore its standing in the Mediterranean. The plan, well-received by both European and African stakeholders, represents a flagship policy closely tied to Meloni’s personal leadership. And precisely for this reason, in further developments we can expect to see Giorgia Meloni at the forefront, as demonstrated by her recent intervention in the European Parliament.

As noted earlier, however, it remains unclear how the government’s cuts on public spending match those new massive spending promises. With all probability, the Italian public might expect a redirection of expenditures, where public health, green transition and innovation get de-prioritized.

So what?

The halfway point has been passed. Three years on and Giorgia Meloni has indeed brought a notable period of political stability to Italy—an unusual feat in recent decades. This internal steadiness has facilitated the country’s emergence as a credible, active participant in Mediterranean, European, and transatlantic affairs. Internationally, Italy projects reliability and dynamism, largely reflecting its leader’s pragmatic approach—a style which prioritizes national interests and reasserts Rome’s presence in both longstanding (Europe, the US) and previously neglected diplomatic spheres (African continent).

However, the economic outlook remains a point of concern. The focus on austerity and stability maintains the status quo rather than catalyse the ambitious reforms needed to overcome the structural stagnation that keeps affecting the Italian economy and Italians’ wages. This should be addressed by investing on youth, labour productivity, migration and finally targeting regional development disparities.

Meloni can and should demonstrate to really have at heart Italy and Italians’ best interests by providing a long-term vision that has been long lacking in Italian politics.

In summary, Giorgia Meloni’s diplomatic acumen deserves recognition for transforming and enhancing Italy’s international profile, but it remains to be seen whether her government’s cautious economic stewardship can deliver the transformative growth essential for lasting progress. This tension between political stability, diplomatic success, and economic inertia will define challenges and opportunities facing Italy as it looks ahead to 2027 and beyond.

Miriam Forno is an Assistant Editor Intern at the AIIA National Office, Canberra. She is currently completing her exchange semester at the Australian National University, as part of her Master’s in International Relations and Diplomatic Affairs at the University of Bologna, Italy.

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